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Planning and Know-How: the Relationship between 
Knowledge and Calculation in Hayek’s Case for Markets 
 
DAN GREENWOOD*  
Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, London, UK 
 
ABSTRACT Ludwig von Mises’ calculation argument against socialism is of fundamental 
importance to the modern-day case for the market. Yet it is to Hayek that some Austrian-
influenced theorists turn when responding to the computational models for non-market price 
fixing proposed by some socialists. Their reading of Hayek’s epistemological argument for 
markets as distinct from Mises’ calculation argument needs to be questioned. Hayek’s 
emphasis upon the dispersal of knowledge across space and time is consistent with Mises’ 
position. In spite of his philosophical critique of rationalist constructivism and his treatment 
of tacit knowledge, Hayek’s case for the market ultimately relies upon the Misean calculation 
argument. Hayek’s work is therefore best understood as a shift in emphasis rather than as a 




The work of the two Austrian economists, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, is 
of defining importance for the modern-day case for the market. In his seminal 
contribution to what is now known as the ‘socialist calculation debate,’ Mises (1920) 
developed what is referred to as the ‘economic calculation argument’ against 
socialism. Mises’ thesis strongly influenced his pupil Hayek, who further developed 
the Austrian position. Their work has been the subject of revived interest since the 
1980s. One notable reason for this interest is that, as is to be further explored here, the 
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Austrian critique of socialism raises profound problems for the neoclassical model of 
economic calculation, from which some notable socialist proposals originated. 
Furthermore, the Austrians’ work helps to explain some of the problems that plagued 
attempts at central planning during the 20th century such as in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe (Boettke, 1993). Proposals for the replacement of the market with a 
system of non-market planning are now widely viewed as doomed to inevitable 
failure. There seems to be an absence of a satisfactory response from the left to the 
‘calculation problem’ raised by Mises and Hayek, and their case for the 
indispensability of markets is generally viewed as having been vindicated.  
Still, the socialist calculation debate continues to this day. Cockshott & 
Cottrell (1993) argue that rapid developments in information technology give cause 
for revisiting the question of the feasibility of non-market planning. Their 
computational planning model calculates the cost of all goods in terms of the 
minimum labour time required to produce them. The view that computation can 
replace markets can be traced back to Oskar Lange (1967, p. 158) who stated that 
markets are ‘a computing device of the pre-electronic age.’ 
Drawing from the work of Hayek, certain writers emphasise that the essential 
function of markets is not computational but epistemological (Horwitz, 1996; Boettke, 
1993, pp. 52–53; Hodgson, 1998). The epistemological emphasis of Hayek’s case for 
the market is sometimes read as being distinct from Mises’ calculation argument. 
Important clarification of Mises and Hayek on socialist calculation has been achieved 
by previous commentaries, correctly emphasising the common ground that they share. 
Yet there remain different views on the relationship between the Hayekian 
‘knowledge argument’ and Mises’ calculation argument. As Parsons (1997, p. 63). 
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comments, ‘there is no general agreement concerning the nature of the argument 
Hayek is advancing.’  
This paper revisits the work of Mises and Hayek in order to explore the source 
of these disagreements. Section 2 introduces Mises’ calculation argument against 
socialism and the proposals of the socialists Lange and Dickinson towards whom 
Hayek’s knowledge argument was particularly directed. Section 3 offers a preliminary 
suggestion as to the relationship between Hayek’s knowledge argument and Mises’ 
calculation argument. Sections 4–7 then each discuss different aspects of Hayek’s 
treatment of knowledge. Section 4 details the core themes of economic change and the 
spatial dispersion of knowledge. Section 5 outlines the two functions of markets 
identified by Hayek, those of knowledge encapsulation and discovery. Section 6 
considers Hayek’s discussion of the limitations of rationalism. Section 7 analyses a 
further epistemological theme, that of ‘tacit knowledge’. The reading of Hayek 
offered here has important implications for the contemporary debate about the 
feasibility of a computational model of non-market calculation, as is explained in 
Section 8.  
 
2. The Socialist Calculation Debate 
2.1. Mises’ Calculation Argument 
The economic calculation argument was formulated by Ludwig von Mises in a paper 
on ‘Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth’(1920).1 Mises argues that 
the process of market exchange is a necessary condition of rational economy because 
                                                 
1 A little known, early version of the argument had been offered by Pierson in 1902 and 
versions by Weber and Brutzkus were published contemporaneously to Mises’. Yet Mises’ 
paper is generally agreed to be the most comprehensive statement of the ‘economic 
calculation argument’ against socialism (Lavoie, 1985, p. 2n). 
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it generates prices that allow economic actors to compare the value of goods in terms 
of a commensurable unit. The essential problem for socialism, Mises contends, lies in 
the absence of markets for factors of production, i.e. the natural resources, human 
labour and manufactured goods that are used in the production process. In all but the 
very simplest economies, producers would have no means of evaluating these factors 
of production. For Mises and later for Hayek, the problem is insoluble. 
 
2.2. The Neoclassical Model 
Mises’ argument was considered by some to have been refuted in advance by the 
mathematical model of socialist pricing formulated by Enrico Barone (1908). Firmly 
in the neoclassical tradition, Barone’s model demonstrated that it is possible, in 
principle, for a socialist ministry of production to establish a set of ‘prices’ that are 
analogous to market equilibrium. The upshot of Barone’s paper, as Schumpeter (1954, 
p. 988–989) summarises, ‘is that there exists for any centrally controlled socialism a 
system of equations that possess a uniquely determined set of solutions, in the same 
sense and with the same qualifications as does perfectly competitive capitalism, and 
that this set enjoys similar maximum properties.’ 
Drawing from Barone’s 1908 paper, Oskar Lange (1937, p. 55) considered 
such an a priori model of socialist pricing to be sufficient to refute Mises’ calculation 
argument. A number of Lange’s contemporaries, such as Dobb (1937, p.  274) and 
Dahl & Lindblom (1953, p. 211) accepted this interpretation of Mises as having 
denied the logical, a priori possibility of socialism (Bergson, 1948, pp. 445–446; 
Rothbard, 1991, pp. 53–54). However, the more recent literature on Mises and Hayek 
highlights that their critique of the neoclassical model focused upon the unrealistic set 
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of assumptions upon which it is based (see Lavoie, 1985, pp. 117–124); Murrell, 
1983; Vaughn, 1980; Boettke, 2000, pp. 14–18). 
As Barone himself made clear, his ‘a priori’ model of socialist pricing 
assumes the availability to the ministry of the following three sets of knowledge:  
 
• The quantities of fixed capital.  
• The production functions (or ‘productive coefficients’) for producing goods.  
• The level of social welfare produced by any given level of production.  
 
Each assumption requires the ministry to assemble a vast amount of data and it is 
perhaps for this reason that there are doubts as to whether Barone himself saw 
equation solving to be a practicable procedure for central planning (Lavoie, 1985, pp. 
83-85).  
Nevertheless, this neoclassical model led socialists, notably Henry Dickinson 
(1933) to propose that such a mathematical model could be used by the central 
planning board to calculate prices in socialism. For Oskar Lange, the significance of 
the neoclassical model was that it showed there to be no necessary connection 
between equilibrium prices and market exchange. Unlike Dickinson, Lange (1937, p. 
67) dismissed the need for centralised, non-market price fixing to be based upon the 
solution of ‘hundreds of thousands of equations.’ Instead, he suggests that, through a 
process of trial and error adjustment, the central planning board could ensure that 
equilibrium is reached.2 This procedure would involve raising prices for those factors 
                                                 
2 It is important to note however that Dickinson’s proposals for socialist calculation were 
never entirely reliant upon the equation-solving approach. He also suggests that there would 
be a role for marginal price adjustment (Dickinson, 1939, pp. 99–105). 
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of production that fall short and lowered for those that accumulate (ibid., p. 66).  
The trial and error method was the subject of strong criticism from Hayek 
(1940) in particular, for whom it reflected the flawed assumptions of the equilibrium 
model. The assumption that the planning board ‘will possess at least as much 
knowledge as the individual entrepreneurs’ in a market economy ‘and will therefore 
be in a position to make the decisions at least as good if not better than that in which 
the entrepreneurs are now’ (ibid., pp. 201–202) is said to neglect the spatially 
dispersed and ever changing nature of knowledge which makes indispensable the 
decentralisation that only markets can achieve. 
Hayek’s ‘knowledge argument’ for the market has been suggested to be 
distinct from the Misean calculation problem. This view has recently been put by 
Ioannides (2000, p. 59): 
 
For Hayek… the problem of knowledge is not reducible to knowing the 
prices of the means of production. Consequently, and in contrast to Mises, his 
case against central planning does not rest on the system’s ability to calculate 
rationally on the basis of freely formed prices but, instead, on its ability to 
utilise the knowledge possessed by all market agents. 
 
It is this question of the relationship of the calculation and knowledge arguments that 
we shall now introduce before proceeding with a detailed analysis of Hayek’s 
treatment of the concept of knowledge. 
 
3. A Separate Knowledge Problem? 
There is a sense in which the knowledge and calculation arguments are logically 
independent of one another, as is indicated by Joseph Salerno (1990) in his 
commentary on Mises. He draws from a thought experiment discussed by Mises, 
 7
imagining that, for a given moment in time, central planners in a non-market economy 
are in possession of the full range of knowledge of production possibilities. Even if 
such an assumption is made, argues Salerno, planners would still face a calculation 
problem due to the absence of market prices and therefore of any means of comparing 
the complex plethora of production possibilities. The calculation argument is in this 
sense logically separable from the knowledge problem.  
Yet we might also ask if the converse is possible—i.e. whether a solution to 
the calculation problem could be conceived that does not presuppose a solution of the 
knowledge problem. A solution to the calculation problem requires that some basis 
for calculation, such as shadow prices, is available to planners. This itself is 
dependent upon a prior solution to the knowledge problem, for the means of 
calculation would need to encapsulate the required knowledge in order to count as a 
solution to the calculation problem. A solution to the knowledge problem is thus a 
necessary condition for a solution to the calculation problem, even if Salerno is right 
that it is not sufficient. In this sense, the knowledge problem is a part of the 
calculation problem, rather than being logically distinct from it. It will be argued here 
that Hayek’s discussion of knowledge is quite consistent with this point. 
 
4. Two Dimensions of Knowledge 
The assessment offered here of Hayek’s knowledge argument explores two important 
themes in his work: the spatial dispersion of knowledge and economic change. These 
themes, together referred to as ‘the particular circumstances of time and place,’ 





4.1. The Spatial Dimension 
Hayek (1937, p. 50) describes the ‘problem of the division of knowledge’ as ‘the 
really central problem of economics as a social science.’ Knowledge, as Hayek puts it 
‘is not given to anyone in its totality’ but is ‘dispersed among many people’ (ibid., 
p.85). The knowledge required for economic decision-making ‘never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess’ (ibid., 
p.77). The division of labour amplifies this dispersion of knowledge amongst 
individuals. A further form of knowledge dispersion arises from the particular 
characteristics of goods and services such as their spatial location, age and other 
attributes: ‘Two technically similar goods in different places or in different packings 
or of a different age cannot possibly be treated as equal in usefulness for most 
purposes if even a minimum of efficient use is to be secured’ (Hayek, 1935b, p. 154). 
Often, certain products ‘are produced on individual orders, perhaps after invitation for 
tenders,’ or ‘are rarely produced twice in short intervals’ (Hayek, 1940, pp. 188–189). 
All of this means that human skills and material factors of production have many 
more spatially particular, economically relevant characteristics than might first appear 
to be the case. The result of this spatial dispersion is that, for planning to be effective, 
‘a staggering amount of information’ is required (Shapiro, 1989, p. 141). 
 
4.2. The Temporal Dimension 
As well as the dispersion of knowledge across space, Hayek also emphasises 
‘continual and continuous change’, what might be referred to as the temporal 
dispersion of knowledge. The importance of this second feature of knowledge is 
summarised in ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ when Hayek (1935a, p. 82) states 
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that ‘economic problems arise always and only in consequence of change.’ He makes 
clear that he considers continual economic change to be inevitable in any economy, 
including a non-market one. In a planned, socialist system, he suggests, ‘change will 
be quite as frequent as under capitalism; it will also be quite as unpredictable. All 
action will have to be based on anticipation of future events, and the expectations on 
the part of different entrepreneurs will naturally differ’ (Hayek, 1935b, p. 173).  
 
4.3. Comparing Mises and Hayek on Knowledge 
As explained above, a standard interpretation is that Mises denied the logical 
possibility of socialism. From this it follows that Hayek’s thesis, by denying only the 
practicality of socialism, was a retreat from Mises. However, it is now widely 
recognised that Mises does not deny the logical validity of mathematical models of 
socialist pricing. His argument is rather that such models could not be applied in the 
real world. The themes of economic change and the division of knowledge are present 
in Mises’ elucidation of this view, with the former being quite explicit: ‘the problem 
of economic calculation is of economic dynamics: it is no problem of economic 
statics’ (Mises, 1922, p. 139). Mises also emphasises the importance of the dynamic 
activity of entrepreneurs in the market in response to continual change.  
  While he does not place the same emphasis upon the spatial dispersal of 
knowledge, Mises’ discussion of the complex array of production possibilities does 
allude to the vast amount of information embodied in market prices. This is evident, 
for example, in his discussion of the complex array of production possibilities that is 
faced in a choice between numerous possible energy projects: ‘Here the roundabout 
processes of production are many and each is very lengthy’ (Mises, 1920, p. 96). The 
heterogeneity of the knowledge that would be required by planners is emphasised, for 
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example in his discussion of the valuation of labour: ‘it is certain that there exist 
among men varying degrees of capacity and dexterity, which cause the products and 
services of labour to have varying qualities’ (ibid., p. 114). The spatial dispersion of 
knowledge is, at least implicitly, a theme in Mises.  
Hayek follows Mises in regarding the temporal dimension to be of 
fundamental importance: 
 
If in the real world we had to deal with approximately constant data, that is, if 
the problem were to find a price system which then could be left more or less 
unchanged for long periods, then the proposal under consideration would not 
be so entirely unreasonable. With given and constant data such a state of 
equilibrium could indeed be approached by the method of trial and error. But 
this is far from being the situation in the real world, where constant change is 
the rule. Whether and how far anything approaching the desirable equilibrium 
is ever reached depends entirely on the speed with which the adjustments are 
made. (Hayek, 1940, p. 188) 
 
This allowance for the feasibility of socialist calculation once an approximately static 
economy is assumed (Hayek, 1935a, p. 82), suggests that, for Hayek, the spatial 
dispersion of knowledge does not, in itself, constitute a decisive argument against 
non-market planning. As Hayek had previously put it, ‘economic problems arise 
always and only in consequence of change.’3  
Neither Mises nor Hayek considers the opposite scenario of an economy 
where there is only very limited spatial dispersion of knowledge but very rapid 
change. To adapt an example used by Mises, this might be a Robinson Crusoe 
                                                 
3 Essentially the same point is made in ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ when he states 
that ‘as long as things continue as before, or at least as they were expected to, there arise no 
new problems requiring a decision, no need to form a new plan’ (Hayek, 1935a, 82) . The 
point is also made in ‘The Meaning of Competition’ (1946, p. 101). 
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economy where there are rapid changes in the natural environment. We can only 
speculate whether Mises and Hayek would consider Crusoe to face a calculation 
problem in such a scenario and whether they would differ in their views on this 
question. We cannot, therefore, reach any conclusive verdict on whether they view 
economic change to be more decisive for their argument than the undoubtedly 
profound implications of the spatial dispersion of knowledge. This philosophical point 
was perhaps not especially important to them, for their emphasis was upon the 
compound effects of spatio-temporal dispersion in real economies. We can only 
conclude that there are no clear grounds for distinguishing Mises and Hayek in terms 
of the relative importance they attach to the spatial and temporal dimensions of 
knowledge in the case for markets.  
The only sense in which Hayek clearly differs is in placing a more explicit 
emphasis upon the nature of knowledge. An important reason for this difference is 
that Hayek, whose writings came later than Mises’ opening contributions, was 
responding to the neoclassical models of socialist calculation offered by Lange and 
Dickinson (Lavoie, 1985, p. 158). Their work was published in the 1930s and as we 
have seen, made some explicit assumptions about the knowledge that planners would 
have available to them.  
 
5. Market Prices and Knowledge  
Hayek’s discussion of the spatio-temporal dispersion of knowledge thus supports the 
Misean thesis. The Misean position is also strengthened by Hayek’s identification of 
two knowledge-related functions of market prices, each of which is now outlined. The 
first is the encapsulation of knowledge and the second is the facilitation of knowledge 
discovery.  
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5.1. Knowledge Encapsulation 
Firstly, prices encapsulate a great deal of information about particular events and 
circumstances, saving the need for economic actors to acquire this knowledge directly 
(Hayek 1935a). They therefore perform a communicative function, serving as a 
necessary guide to economic actors. This is a development of the point made by 
Mises (1920, p. 102) when he refers to prices as ‘aids to the mind.’ Furthermore, 
Hayek, like Mises before him, recognises that prices can quickly absorb new 
information. As Hayek points out: ‘where only a few know yet of an important new 
fact, the much maligned speculators will see to it that the relevant information will 
rapidly be spread by an appropriate change of prices’ (Hayek, 1976a, p. 116; cf. 
Mises, 1949, pp.218–220). Both recognised that such adaptations of the market are an 
imperfect reflection of the continual shifts in supply and demand. Nonetheless, market 
prices are indispensable guides to economic actors in the decision-making process.  
 
5.2. Knowledge Discovery 
The second important function of market prices is the facilitation of a process of 
knowledge discovery. Hayek (1968, p. 181) puts the point as follows: ‘which goods 
are scarce goods, or which things are goods, and how scarce or valuable they are— 
these are precisely the things which competition has to discover.’ In the market 
economy ‘we do not know in advance the facts that determine the actions of 
competitors’ and so we need to consider ‘competition as a procedure for the discovery 
of such facts as, without resort to it, would not be known to anyone, or at least would 
not be utilised’ (ibid., p. 179). This competitive process is facilitated by the conveying 
of information through the price system: ‘Provisional results from the market process 
at each stage alone tell individuals what to look for…. Prices direct their attention to 
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what is worth finding out about market offers for various things and services’ (ibid., 
p. 181–182). The knowledge discovery process of competition is, as had been 
emphasised by Mises, spurred by the incentive of monetary reward for producers and 
entrepreneurs who discover more efficient ways of satisfying the preferences of 
consumers: ‘we rely on self-interest because only through it can we induce producers 
to use knowledge which we do not possess, and to take actions the effects of which 
only they can determine’ (Hayek, 1979, p. 70). 
This knowledge discovery function of markets is the source of Hayek’s 
objection to neoclassical models of socialist calculation such as those offered by 
Dickinson and Lange. Their assumptions concerning the availability of knowledge 
overlook the question of how knowledge is discovered. Hayek (1976a, p. 69) takes 
issue with the neoclassical assumption that production costs ‘are an objectively given 
fact ascertainable by inspection, and not something which can be determined only on 
the basis of his knowledge and judgment—a knowledge which will be wholly 
different when he acts in a highly competitive market from what it would be if he 
were the sole producer or one of a very few.’ Hayek also questions the neoclassical 
assumption concerning knowledge of the preferences of buyers in the market: 
 
In the traditional treatment of equilibrium analysis part of this difficulty is 
apparently avoided by the assumption that the data, in the form of demand 
schedules representing individual tastes and technical facts, are equally given 
to all individuals and that their acting on the same premises will somehow 
lead to their plans becoming adapted to each other. (Hayek, 1937, p. 38) 
 
Hayek’s discussion of market competition as a discovery procedure intimates that it is 
questionable whether economic knowledge exists at all, prior to its discovery. For 
example, he suggests that knowledge can be defined as a capacity: ‘The knowledge of 
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which I speak consists rather of a capacity to find out particular circumstances, which 
becomes effective only if possessors of this knowledge are informed by the market 
which kinds of things or services are wanted, and how urgently they are wanted’ 
(Hayek, 1968, p. 182).  
Thus Hayek might be read as calling into question the objectivity of the 
economic knowledge that is continually discovered. ‘Knowledge discovery’ might 
best be referred to as ‘knowledge generation’. Yet, however we define the 
epistemological status of undiscovered knowledge, the important point to emphasise 
here is that the process of market exchange is, for Hayek, an indispensable aid in the 
quest for new knowledge. 
 
5.3. The Case against Planning 
The flip side of this view of economic information as the product of competition is 
that planning is deficient as a substitute for the market. For Hayek, once the nature of 
knowledge is understood, planning as a form of resource allocation can be seen to 
suffer from fundamental difficulties. In contrast to the decentralised market 
mechanism, planning institutions must gather knowledge prior to undertaking 
economic calculation. For Hayek, this separation of knowledge gathering and 
calculation is an inherent weakness of planning. This weakness becomes evident 
through consideration of the six stages of planning that, while not explicitly defined 
by Hayek, can be inferred from his critique. It should of course be borne in mind that 
in practice these stages might overlap and might need to be reiterated. They are as 
follows: 
 
1. Specification of knowledge requirements 
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2. Knowledge acquisition  
3. Aggregation of knowledge into a communicable form  
4. Communication of knowledge to planners  
5. Plan formulation 
6. Plan implementation 
 
The spatial dispersal of knowledge means that each stage of planning would need to 
manage a large volume of information. The problems of planning would be further 
compounded by economic change. The knowledge requirements specified in stage 1 
might have changed before stages 6, 5, or even stages 4 or 3 of the planning process 
are complete. The unpredictability of economic change causes significant problems 
for economic planning proposals: 
 
The alternative of having all the individual managers of businesses convey to 
a central planning authority the knowledge of particular facts which they 
possess is clearly impossible—simply because they never can know 
beforehand which of the many concrete circumstances about which they have 
knowledge or could find out might be of importance to the central planning 
authority. (Hayek, 1976b, p. 236) 
 
5.4. Summary 
To summarise, the need for knowledge discovery is considered by Hayek to constitute 
a decisive case for the decentralised market system and against economic planning. In 
the market system, the process of price formation incorporates the multitude of 
decisions made by locally situated actors. These prices enable economic actors to 
effectively grasp and discover spatio-temporally dispersed knowledge and to 
understand and contribute to processes of economic change. Knowledge discovery 
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and economic decision-making are therefore performed simultaneously. It is in this 
sense that the problem of knowledge is presented by Hayek as part of the calculation 
problem. 
In a planning system, in contrast to the market, knowledge discovery and 
economic calculation functions are two distinct processes. Whether meant as a partial 
or complete substitute for markets, planning requires an initial phase in which 
knowledge is assimilated to a central location. This is the case regardless of the 
geographical scale of the exercise and of the number of decision-makers involved. 
Hayek’s point is that this separation of knowledge gathering and calculation makes 
planning institutions vulnerable to the problem of information loss. In the case of 
centrally planned economies this vulnerability becomes a fundamental inadequacy in 
the face of spatio-temporally dispersed knowledge.  
An important qualification must be made to this account of the Hayekian 
knowledge argument. For Hayek does not entirely reject the possibility of centralised 
institutions having access to economically relevant knowledge. In calling for a shift of 
emphasis away from the present day prominence of centrally organised bodies of 
scientific experts to the local knowledge of the ‘man on the spot’ (Hayek, 1935a, p. 
83), he is still allowing a role for the former. Hayek’s discussion of the spatio-
temporal dispersion of knowledge certainly implies a strong scepticism about the 
capacity of planning institutions to gather knowledge through non-market processes, 
though it is not a complete rejection. 
 
6. Abstraction and Knowledge 
As we have seen, the dispersion of knowledge across time and space lies at the root of 
the argument for markets given by both Mises and Hayek. A further aspect of 
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Hayek’s work with an epistemological flavour appears in the opening chapter of the 
first volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty. He offers a critique of what he refers to 
as ‘rationalist constructivism,’ the view that ‘human institutions will serve human 
purposes, only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes’ (Hayek, 
1973, p. 8). He points out that while completely rational deliberation ‘demands 
complete knowledge of all the relevant facts’ (ibid., p. 12), such complete knowledge 
is impossible because of the inherent limitations of the abstract concepts in terms of 
which we define knowledge. As Parsons (1997, p. 70) puts it, abstract concepts 
cannot precisely reflect the ‘concrete’ actuality that is epistemologically prior to them. 
Abstractions are therefore an incomplete, albeit indispensable, ‘means to cope with 
the complexity of the concrete’ (Hayek, 1973, p. 29).  
Here, Hayek’s epistemology is reminiscent of Karl Popper, whose work shares 
with Hayek a general theme of the limitations of rationality. 
 
The reason why all description is selective is, roughly speaking, the infinite 
wealth and variety of the possible aspects of the facts of our world. In order 
to describe this infinite wealth, we have at our disposal only a finite number 
of finite series of words. Thus we may describe as long as we like: our 
description will always be incomplete, a mere selection, and a small one at 
that, of the facts which present themselves for description. (Popper, 1945, p. 
261) 
 
Hayek does not explicitly relate this point to the problem of planning, though it 
clearly does have implications for the feasibility of the different stages of the planning 
process at which knowledge needs to be consciously specified and communicated. 
Some commentators have inferred that, for Hayek, the limitations of abstraction mean 
that it would be logically impossible for the knowledge required for central planning 
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to be assimilated (Parsons, 1997; Gray, 1986, p. 25). Here, clarification is needed. The 
‘limitations of abstraction’ argument is not, in itself, decisive as an argument against 
planning and it is not clear that Hayek intended it to be such. For rather than applying 
to any specific kind of knowledge, the argument applies to knowledge in general. All 
abstract concepts, including market prices, are necessarily imperfect reflections of 
concrete actuality. Prices reflect the institutions through which they are formed and 
the question therefore remains of which types of prices are the best guides, those 
provided by market or non-market institutions? As discussed above, Hayek himself 
acknowledges the imperfection of market prices in his critique of neoclassical 
economics. His argument for the superiority of the decentralised mechanism of the 
market as opposed to centralised planning is therefore substantiated by his discussion 
of the encapsulation and discovery functions of market prices in the face of spatio-
temporally dispersed knowledge. 
 
7. Tacit knowledge 
Closely related to the ‘limitations of abstraction’ argument is the point drawn by 
numerous commentators from Hayek that much knowledge is ‘tacit’ in nature. This is 
the main argument offered by Hodgson (1998, 2005), for example, in his Hayekian 
critique of some contemporary proposals for non-market planning. The phrase ‘tacit 
knowledge’ is not used by Hayek himself. It is drawn from the work of Michael 
Polanyi who uses it to refer to knowledge that cannot be explicitly specified and so is 
‘more than we can tell.’ While Hayek makes only a brief reference to Polanyi (Hayek, 
1962, p. 44n), he does use Ryle’s closely related concept of ‘knowing how’ (Ryle 
1945–46) in The Sensory Order (Hayek, 1952) and in ‘Rules, Perception and 
Intelligibility’ (Hayek, 1962). Knowing how is distinguished from knowing that. The 
 19
latter can be articulated whereas the former refers to abilities and skills that are 
inarticulable, though they can be taught and learnt.  
In considering Hayek’s illustrations of ‘knowing how’, it is useful to consider 
another distinction that he had previously made, between ‘knowledge as a skill’ and 
‘knowledge of processes in society’ (Hayek, 1937, p. 51n). In the later writings where 
Hayek explicitly introduces the concept of ‘knowing how,’ the examples he gives are 
of the former kind: ‘to carve, to ride a bicycle, to ski, or to tie a knot’ or play billiards 
(Hayek, 1962, pp. 43–44). The ability to anticipate other people’s behaviour is 
another example that is knowledge as a skill. It involves judging whether ‘an 
approach of another person is friendly or hostile, that he is playing a game or willing 
to sell us some commodity or intends to make love, we recognize without knowing 
what we recognize it from’ (ibid., p. 55).  
Knowledge of ‘processes in society’, Hayek explains, includes knowledge ‘of 
how the different commodities can be obtained and used’ (Hayek, 1937, p. 51). In 
other words, it includes economic knowledge. It is such economic knowledge that 
Hayek discusses in his contributions to the calculation debate, starting in the 1930s—
the knowledge of ‘[t]he shipper who earns his living from using otherwise empty or 
half-filled journeys of tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose whole knowledge is 
almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or the arbitrageur who gains from 
local differences of commodity prices’ (Hayek, 1935a, p. 80). Much of this economic 
knowledge is communicable ‘knowledge that,’ such as the knowledge of the shipper 
in the passage above (Fleetwood, 1997, p. 166). Yet some elements of economic 
knowledge are not fully communicable, such as the negotiating skills of the estate 
agent or the arbitrageur. These abilities involve adapting to a multiplicity of particular 
situations in various ways that could not all be fully specified in advance of them 
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being exercised. They are examples of what might be referred to as ‘economic know-
how.’  
Such economic know-how can be distinguished from skills that are non-
economic in nature, on the grounds that it is concerned with ‘processes in society’. 
Hayek’s thesis that markets are an indispensable means of knowledge discovery is 
meant only to refer to know-how of the economic sort. The existence of non-
economic know-how, such as the ability to ride a bike or play snooker, has no such 
dependence upon markets. The use of the concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ in the 
literature on Hayek tends not to make this distinction between economic and non-
economic know-how.  
The existence of tacit knowledge constitutes an argument for the market only 
in so far as it is know-how of the economic kind. The existence of economic know-
how is dependent upon the ‘knowing that’ provided by market prices as a means of 
calculation. The entrepreneurs exercising economic know-how act, as Horwitz (1996, 
p. 72) puts it, ‘within a set of institutions, namely markets with money prices, that 
provide them with information about what to do and how to do it.’ Just as prices are a 
necessary precondition for knowledge discovery (see Section 5.2 above), they are also 
a prerequisite for the exercising of economic know-how. Hence the tacit knowledge 
argument for markets is inextricably connected to the Misean calculation argument.  
In response to Hayek, it might be asked whether other, non-market, economic 
indicators could facilitate the discovery and tacit utilisation of knowledge. Ultimately, 
the Austrian argument is based upon the premise that there could be no such indicator. 





The essence of Hayek’s case is that the knowledge encapsulation and discovery 
functions of markets are indispensable in the face of the spatio-temporal dispersion of 
knowledge. This is quite consistent with Mises’ position and Hayek’s more explicit 
discussion of knowledge is therefore best considered, as Horwtiz (1998, p. 443) puts 
it, to be a ‘shift in emphasis’ rather than a departure from Mises: ‘Hayek simply took 
for granted that Mises’ original claim in the 1920 article was correct and clear, so that 
Hayek no longer needed to make the point.’ As Lavoie (1985, p. 145) puts it, Hayek’s 
knowledge argument was an expansion of the Misean argument rather than a new 
argument in itself. Indeed, there is no evidence that Hayek himself meant for his 
knowledge argument to be taken as distinct. 
So does Hayek’s epistemological stance refute the possibility of computational 
solutions to the problem of socialist planning? It certainly does emphasise that 
computational approaches face a profound challenge of how to facilitate the 
utilisation of locally situated, often tacit, knowledge in a dynamically changing 
environment. For these reasons, we might agree with Hodgson and Horwitz that the 
Cockshott & Cottrell model does not answer the Austrian case.4 Still, as the analysis 
here shows, Hayek’s argument ultimately hinges upon the contingent claim that the 
spatio-temporal dispersion of knowledge is too complex for any computational system 
to address. There might be grounds for challenging this premise, in view of the recent, 
rapid developments in computational technology. Techniques designed for addressing 
complex problems in dynamically changing domains, have been developed even since 
                                                 
4 For example, the Cockshott & Cottrell model adopts the assumption that technical 
coefficients are known. 
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1993 when Cockshott & Cottrell proposed their model.5 The socialist calculation 
debate looks set to remain very much alive. 
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